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r  Résumé  
Le but de cette communication est d’étudier les effets d’un 
nouveau système décisionnel centré réseau (appelé L16) sur la 
performance des décisions prises. Fondé sur le modèle de la 
décision en adéquation, nous démontrons que la L16 est en 
adéquation avec la représentation interne du problème 
développée par le décideur ainsi qu’avec la tâche qu’il doit 
exécuter. Nous proposons néanmoins certaines améliorations 
susceptibles d’accroître le niveau d’adéquation. 
 
Mots clefs : 
Systèmes d’aide à la décision, Modèle d’adéquation, prise de 
décision en situation, conscience de la situation, performance 
décisionnelle. 
 
 
r  Abstract  
The purpose of this communication is to study the effect of a 
recent networking decision support system (called Link 16) on 
decision performance, within the specific context of military 
operations. Based on a new decision model - the Decisional 
Fit Model – we demonstrate that Link 16 fits with task 
characteristics and decision maker internal representations of 
the problem domain. However, improvements could be 
considered in order to increase the level of fit. 
 
Key-words: 
Decision Making, Fit Model, Decisional Fit, Decision support 
System, Coping strategies. 
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1 Ideas expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do 
not reflect the position of the French Ministry of Defense 
nor of the French Air Force. 
1. Introduction 
In Afghanistan, French fighter pilots are deployed on a daily 
basis to support friendly forces on the battlefield. As the news 
often remind us, such air operations are quite dangerous and 
pilots have to perform decisions under stressing 
circumstances. Currently six Rafale are engaged in 
Afghanistan. They are equipped with a networking decision 
support system (ThÃ³rlindsson) called Link 16, and this 
supports the conduct of the mission.  
In this paper, we focus on Link 16 to analyze the way it 
influences decision performance within the specific context of 
military operations. More precisely, our research question can 
be stated as follows: How do net-centric technologies affect 
decision performance? 
We build our analysis on the well known Technology-Task Fit 
(TTF) literature (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995; Zigurs & 
Khazanchi, 2008), which especially examines DSS 
consequences on decision performance (Kohli & Devaraj, 
2004; Todd & Benbasat, 1992; Williams, Dennis, Stam & 
Aronson, 2007). Because objective measure of system 
performance has not been developed yet, the TTF perspective 
proposed surrogate measures in focusing on users’ evaluations 
and perceived value of the system (Davis, Bagozzi & 
Warshaw, 1989; Goodhue, 1995; Goodhue, Klein & March, 
2000). In this paper, we adopt such an approach in exploring 
users’ perception of link 16 ability to perform task 
requirements. 
Our research question is of theoretical and managerial 
interest. The theoretical interest relates to the decisional fit 
model we develop; and this considers the examination of the 
relations between a task, a decision maker and a system. Such 
a model is drawn from the fit model category. The managerial 
interest relates to practical implications of our model since it 
provides new perspectives to understand the effects of 
networking technology usages for people who are engaged in 
turbulent situation. 
To address this relevant research question, we conducted an 
explorative case study (Yin, 2003) based on a research 
contract funded by the French Ministry of Defense. Executed 
by the research team of the CReA2, this contract especially 
highlighted the problem of acquiring new capabilities in 
relation with the introduction of the multi role fighter aircraft 
Rafale. 
This paper is divided into five parts. Based on a concept-
centric literature review (Webster & Watson, 2002), Section 2 
introduces our model of decisional fit. Section 3 details our 
research methodology. Section 4 presents our case study 
results. Finally, section 5 develops some conclusive remarks. 
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 Research Center of the French Air Force (Centre de 
Recherche de l’Armée de l’air – CReA) 
 2. Theoretical Background: The 
Decisional Fit Model 
Our framework leads to study the link between decision maker 
in natural settings and the performance of his decision. Our 
model is based on the Task-Technology Fit Model (Goodhue 
& Thompson, 1995) and its variations (Todd & Benbasat, 
2000), as well as the Cognitive Fit Model (Shaft & Vessey, 
2006; Vessey, 1991). As other Fit Models, we postulate that 
decision performance is dependent upon the fit between three 
constructs (Decision Maker, System and Task). Putting 
together, these constructs leads to a specific decisional 
behavior. The following figure displays our model: 
 
 
Figure 1 : General Decision Fit Model 
2.1 Key Components of the DF Model 
This section details the three elements composing the DF 
Model: 
• Decision Maker: he plays a critical role in our 
model since he appears twice. First, he is able to 
develop an internal representation of the 
problematic situation he has to deal with. Following 
the TTF perspective, such an internal representation 
depends on (1) individual abilities like motivation 
and attitudes to risk for instance, (2) individual prior 
experience in running the task and (3) the decision 
model individual learned and internalized during 
training times and which significantly structures the 
mental picture of the problem he faces. Second, the 
mental representation of the task solution is related 
to a recognition process, occurring in individual 
mind. Two different kinds of decision maker can be 
found in literature: the expert and the novice. Many 
definitions seek to define the concept of expertise. 
Farrington-Darby & Wilson (2006) proposed a large 
one: “Expertise can describe skills, knowledge or 
abilities, in tasks, activities, jobs, sport and games. 
It can refer to a process such as decision making or 
it can refer to an output such as a decision”. In that 
way, we can consider that expertise is the ability to 
discover what we do not know. This is due to 
learning and experience. On the contrary, novice 
does not have an intelligible vision of the picture he 
copes with. As a result, one of a significant 
difference between expert or novice concerns the 
use of system, especially DSS (Hung, 2003). 
• Task: in our model, the task is decisional. With 
regard to the classical typology of decision making 
literature (Gorry & Scott Morton, 1989), we focus 
on semi-structured decision making process since 
(1) structured decisions do not need an interaction 
between DSS and decision maker and (2) DSS is 
quite needless to support non structured decision 
making process. In our model, task represents the 
mission decision maker has to achieve. In turbulent 
situation, individual has to react quickly in order to 
make an appropriate decision. This is the reason 
why our DF model presents a double arrow linking 
task to external problem representation depicted by 
DSS and to internal problem representation 
developed by decision maker. 
• Decision Support system: DSS depicts the external 
representation of the problem domain as well as the 
problem features (the arrow linking task and 
system). User and machine are combined, making 
up a complex system (the arrow between decision 
maker and DSS). In a semi-structured decisional 
task, there is a division between what the system can 
handle and what the decision maker manages. The 
following figure displays the three cases that can be 
observed: 
 Figure 2 : Task Division between the Decision Maker 
and his Support System 
 
2.2 How Using Decisional Fit Model? 
2.2.1  Decision Making in Natural Settings 
Naturalistic decision making paradigm is based on researches 
led by Klein at the end of 80’ and tested an original path to 
study decision making (Klein, 1998; Klein, Orasanu, 
Calderwood & Zsambok, 1993; Lipshitz, Klein & Carroll, 
2006; Zsambok & Klein, 1997). The principle was quite 
simple: observing the way decision makers behave in natural 
settings. This naturalistic perspective led to a relevant result: 
in context, an expert decision maker coping with a complex, 
urgent and risky situation does not choose between many 
options to decide. Decision results from a recognition primed 
process. In that way, DSS is intended to play a major role at 
the very beginning of decision process rather than at the end 
(Lebraty & Pastorelli-Nègre, 2004). That is the reason why 
the naturalistic decision making perspective is closely linked 
to situation awareness issues (Endsley & Garland, 2000). 
2.2.2 Fit as Gestalt 
Viewed broadly, fit can be defined as the alignment of 
strategy and organizational contingencies firms cope with 
(Venkatraman, 1990). Among many perspectives developed 
by literature, “Fit as Gestalts” appears to be the more 
appropriate for our DF model for the two following reasons: 
(1) Gestalt theory is intrinsically a tested and solid approach. 
From Wertheimer (1938) to Fuller (1990), this approach 
refined its results without changing its foundation: “Gestalt 
psychology views perception and other mental processes as 
holistic rather than atomistic in nature” (Schroeder, 2007); 
(2) “Fit as Gestalts” matches with the naturalistic decision 
making paradigm. In this paper, we state that decision making 
is the result of situation recognition. Hence, the importance of 
this recognition process is predominant. Recognition process 
is a kind of image matching. As Adejumo, Duimering & 
Zhong (2008) mentioned “This approach considers the 
cognitive processes involved in the recognition or formulation 
of an appropriate representation of the problem structure 
enabling the solution to be obtained. Recognizing the 
appropriate problem structure coincides with obtaining the 
solution” (p. 83).  
The following tab describes what fit is in a gestalt perspective: 
Key Characteristic Perspective of fit as 
Gestalts  
Underlying conceptualization 
of fit 
Internal congruence 
Number of variables Multiple 
Analytical scheme(s) for 
testing it 
Numerical taxonomical 
methods as cluster analysis 
or factor analysis 
Measure of fit Ordinal – Interval Measure 
Illustrative references  
Tableau 1: Fit as Gestalt 
2.2.3 Assessing Relationships in the DF Model 
DF model focuses on “fit relationships” between: 
1. Task and DSS (called FIT1) 
2. Decision Maker and DSS (called FIT2) 
3. Decision Maker and Task (called FIT3) 
Regarding our research question, we especially focus on FIT 1 
and FIT 2 since FIT 3 is not primary related to DSS. FIT 1 
questions the level of fitness between task and decision 
support system. It allows examining in which extent system 
characteristics respond to decision maker needs to perform 
task. FIT 2 investigates the level of fitness between decision 
maker and DSS. It allows to measure in which extent 
information provided by the system matches with decision 
makers’ internal representations of the problem they deal 
with. 
 
Figure 3: Model studied 
In order to achieve measurement of DSS performance, we 
exploit users’ evaluations and perceptions of system. As Davis 
(1989), Goodhue (1995) and Goodhue, Klein & March (2000) 
stated, user evaluation of information system is a quite 
reliable surrogate method to assess its success until 
development of a strong theoretical underpinnings in MIS 
literature.  
3. Research Method 
In order to provide a preliminary test of our decisional fit 
model, we conducted an explanatory case study (Yin, 2003) in 
which experts use networking technologies to achieve time 
speed tasks. We selected an extreme single-case study to 
explore the significant phenomenon of decisional fit under 
rare and unusual circumstances (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Yin, 2003). More precisely, we focused on the 
networking technology called Link 16, which fits out many 
NATO fighter aircrafts, such as the American and Belgium 
F16 and the French Rafale. These aircrafts are currently 
deployed in Afghanistan. Pilots and navigators have to 
achieve strike missions, called Close Air Support (CAS), 
which consist in firing or frightening hostile targets that are in 
close proximity to friendly forces. When a troop is in contact, 
the tactical command and control centres promptly task a 
fighter aircrafts patrol to handle the situation. Pilots act under 
clock-speed pressure, and hostile circumstances since they 
used to be targeted by enemy ground fires. In that sense, CAS 
can be considered as a complex mission.  
Within such high-volatile environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Wirtz, Mathieu & Schilke, 2007), Link 16 is viewed as 
a valuable asset since it is able to support fitness between the 
two components of our model (task and decision maker). 
However, technologies’ usages can deeply affect works 
practices (Orlikowski & Robey, 1991; Orlikowski, 1992) and 
generate misfit. We studied the ways pilots and navigators 
evaluate the effects of Link 16 on mission achievement in 
focusing on their narratives and perceived values of system.  
3.1 Context Setting 
3.1.1 Decision Support System: Link 16 
The decision support system we studied is called Link 16. It is 
a wireless decision support system made up of communication 
technologies (such as instant messaging and a kind of email 
device) and up-grading tactical databases. Link 16 has been 
implemented in the Rafale aircrafts recently, at the beginning 
of 2006. Link 16 provides each networked participant with all 
transmissions made by others. For instance, a fighter aircraft 
equipped with Link 16 can receive on its display screen 
information from other neighbouring fighters, the airborne 
control system aircraft AWACS, navy ships, and Special 
Forces units deployed on the battlefield. Such information can 
concern friendly and enemy airplanes’ positions, counter-
battery sites, and location of ground forces. Each fighter can 
display nearly the same picture of the battlespace since what is 
detected by an aircraft is instantly shared by others. Further, 
Link 16 is made up of 128 time slots per second, and 
consequently provides information to a high degree of 
accuracy. 
Link 16 is useful to conduct Close Air Support missions. 
System collects information from the ground through Joint 
STARS (Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) airborne 
that conducts ground surveillance to develop an 
understanding of the enemy location and to support attack 
operations. In some cases, AWACS relays Joint STARS 
information to fighter aircrafts. In effect, unlike US ground 
forces, French soldiers are not fitted out with Link 16 on the 
battlefield. As a result, pilots have to collect data in a different 
way: they use voice channel transmissions with French 
ground forces and collect other tactical information provided 
by AWACS via Link 16.  
Link 16 has deeply modified the way fighters used to 
communicate and exchange tactical information (Gonzales, 
2005). In effect, the typical voice channel transmissions 
provide information relatively slowly and can introduce errors 
due to radio interferences and/or misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations. In comparison, Link 16 is an information 
multiplier and a quite reliable decision support system. 
However, its usage introduces new work practices which are 
able to question users’ current representations of problem 
domain. 
3.1.2 Task: Strike Missions Called Close Air 
Support 
Close Air Support (CAS) is an air action against hostile 
targets which are in a close proximity of friendly forces. Such 
a mission provides firepower in offensive and/or defensive 
operations to neutralize enemies. Execution of CAS 
operations is covered by rules of engagement (RoEs). They 
are directives issued by competent military authorities that 
delineate circumstances and limitations under which 
encountered forces will conduct combat engagement. Every 
country edicts its own rules of engagement, depends on its 
political outlooks. RoEs provide the general framework to 
conduct CAS operations.  
As an element of joint fire support, each service organizes 
CAS within its roles as part of the joint force. As a result, 
CAS requires perfect coordination between ground and air 
forces. Usually, a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC, from 
the Air force or the Army) leads the action of fighter aircrafts 
from the ground in transmitting the appropriate information 
through Link 16 or radio. JTAC communicates the precise 
target localization and makes sure pilots and navigators have 
understood the situation on the ground. He is the most 
qualified service member to perform such activities and 
assumes all the responsibilities associated to targeting. In rare 
circumstances, tactical commander might require CAS when 
no JTAC is available, due to some unforeseen consequence of 
combat operations. In these instances, aircrews have to step 
outside their normal boundaries and execute an emergency 
CAS (ECAS) mission. They try to collect critical information 
from different sources and via different systems (Link 16 and 
radio), such as forces on the ground, Joint STARS and/or 
AWACS, etc. During ECAS, pilots and navigators assume all 
the responsibilities and risks in weapons deployment.  
3.1.3 Decision Makers: Pilots and Navigators 
One of the most critical decisions on the battlespace concerns 
air weapons deployment. In that way, different actors are 
involved in decision making. At the tactical level, the chain of 
command is made up of the Combined Air Operation Centre 
(CAOC), which commands and controls a fleet of hundreds 
allied aircrafts, and the Air Support Operation Centre 
(ASOC), which serves as the air component’s lead for 
executing CAS operations according to priorities of fire. As a 
result, decision to go to support friendly forces is only made 
by chain of command. It plans and organizes CAS missions 
from the beginning to the end. Pilots strictly apply these 
plans, in accordance with the Air Tasking Order (ATO) they 
received from CAOC around 70 hours before taking off. 
Pilots and navigators have to conduct their mission in line 
with this ATO. When they arrive above combat area, they 
decide the way they will handle the situation. Bombardment 
will be done with regards to RoEs impositions. If 
circumstances do not allow enforcing RoEs, aircrews have to 
choice another way, in agreement with JTAC, or alone in case 
of Emergency CAS. For instance, they can realize show of 
force in order to frighten enemy forces, without shooting 
them.  
As a result, pilots and navigators assume large responsibilities 
on the battlefield. That is the reason why French Air Force has 
sent its best fighters in Afghanistan. Currently, six Rafale are 
engaged over there. Aircrews have thousands hours of flight 
and they used to train together all year long. They are based in 
Kandahar and are involved in all kinds of CAS.  
3.2 Data Collection 
We used mixture data collection methods to achieve 
triangulation. In that way, we sought to enhance confidence in 
our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989) and to provide an appropriate 
level of internal validity (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data 
sources included individual and collective interviews, archival 
records, and reports from the field. We collected primary and 
secondary data. Concerning the former, eight semi-structured 
interviews were realized with pilots and navigators of Rafale. 
Each interview lasted on average one hour and a half and were 
tape-recorded and transcribed. We followed an interview 
guide which focused on Link 16 usages on the Afghan 
battlefield and its unexpected effects. We encouraged 
narration in order to grasp the ways pilots use Link 16 to 
make decision in action, under stressing, hostile and time-
pressure conditions. We also interviewed an AWACS mission 
commander who is used to command and control the 
battlespace with Link 16. He narrated his experiences and his 
viewpoints concerning the advantages and the limitations of 
such a decision support system. This meeting has been the 
opportunity to observe how Link 16 works since we attended 
to an air operation simulation. Further, we gathered French 
after-action reports from the field as well as from NATO 
training exercises. They concerned pilots reviews related to 
the impact of Link 16 on mission improvement, and potential 
problems they had to deal with. Finally, we collected data 
concerning French doctrinal vision of Link 16, in studying 
internal archives and interviewing three high-ranking French 
Air force officers assigned to think the near-future evolutions 
of Link 16. 
Concerning the secondary data collection, we interviewed 9 
pilots of Mirage-5 and 6 pilots and navigators of Mirage 
2000D to understand the way they work without Link 16. 
They allowed us to improve our knowledge of pilot’s skills 
and competences. These interviews have been also the 
opportunity to thoroughly understand in which extent Link 16 
introduces changes in work practices. Further, we studied 
American institutional monographs published by think-tanks 
such as the Rand Corporation and the CCRP, documentations 
from the Department of Defense (DoD), and US Air force 
after-action reports from Afghanistan and Iraq. In effect, 
American forces have more experience than French Air force 
concerning Link 16 usages on the battlefield and can easier 
stand back to assess its effects on mission achievement. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
In order to assess the effect of Link 16 on decisional fit, we 
had to document and analyse pilots and navigators’ 
evaluations and perceptions related to the ways this system 
has modified mission achievement. To do this, the data 
analysis was conducted in two main steps: coding and writing 
monographs. Concerning the coding, we used the qualitative 
analysis software called N-Vivo7 to categorize our 
observations, field notes, and interviews transcripts. We first 
created main categories, ‘down’ from our research questions 
and design, and then we produced new nodes ‘in vivo’ from 
the words, sentences and/or paragraphs. Using queries, we 
produced qualitative matrix displays in order to compare 
multiple pairs of items and to build an overall pattern of our 
data.  
Concerning the second step of data analysis, monograph was 
produced for each interview realized and sent to interviewees. 
Feedbacks allow us to refine our observations and go deeper 
into our understanding of the role played by Link 16 on 
decision performance (Vaast & Levina, 2006). 
4. Results 
Overall, pilots and navigators’ perception of Link 16 is quite 
positive. They all agree that Link 16 significantly improves 
the way they achieve air operations. 66.05% of interviewees 
spontaneously point out that Link 16 enhances mission 
capabilities in increasing information quality and share-
abilities: 
“I can use a metaphor: before [Link 16], we used to run in a 
tunnel with only torchlight to guide us. Now, with Link 16, 
you’d switched the light on.” 
“With Link 16, it becomes simple to perform task. Without 
Link 16, it’s hell.” 
In addition to such general comments, line-by-line coding of 
the materials revealed that pilots and navigators evaluate the 
level of fitness in a different way, whether they focus on task 
or decision maker.  
4.1 FIT 1: analysing the level of fitness 
between task and decision support 
system 
As we argued previously, in questioning the level of fitness 
between task and decision support system, we seek to 
understand in which extent system characteristics respond to 
pilots’ task needs to perform combats. Data analysis shed light 
on two main results: (1) pilots and navigators consider that the 
ways Link 16 provides information dramatically reduce risks 
of data misinterpretation and ambiguity. However, (2) users 
evaluations also reveal that it is possible to improve 
characteristics of Link 16 in order to increase the level of 
fitness.  
4.1.1 Link 16 Usages Increase Task and Decision 
Support System Conformity 
Answers to the open-ended question “How the network works 
[in Afghanistan]?” provided detailed information on Link 16 
technological characteristics. In comparison with the way they 
used to conduct air operations with Mirage, pilots and 
navigators noticed two main technological improvements. 
They are related to the quality of (1) visual presentation of the 
tactical situation and (2) intraflight (between aircrafts and 
between aircrafts and AWACS) and extraflight (between 
aircrafts and ground forces) communications. In that way, 
system’s characteristics appear to be in line with pilots’ task 
needs.  
Concerning representation of the tactical situation, Rafale 
pilots and navigators are provided with continually updated 
tracks which visually displayed the precise location and 
velocity of detected aircrafts, counter-battery sites and/or 
ground forces. Different icons appear on the display to 
indicate the nature of the track (friend, enemy or unknown). 
For instance: 
“With Link 16, you gonna see UAVs [Unmanned Air 
Vehicles]. You gonna have a little symbol on your screen. 
Other icons tell you “keep careful, there’s a counter-battery 
site over there!” or visually, graphically show you that the 
fuel tanker’s getting away.”  
“The key of decision? Getting a good representation of 
operational situation!” 
In addition, symbols are coloured to provide information 
related to the origin of detections. In that way, pilots 
immediately know if tracks are transmitted by AWACS, 
Special Forces or by its own radar system. Such extra 
information also indicates whether a track has been merged or 
not by system Merging operations are critical since they allow 
pilots to collect simplified information on their display. As a 
result, they do not have to manually differentiate between 
many tracks and analyze each of them anymore:  
“Link 16 implementation is a mean to pretty improve 
information gathering and reduce manual tasks.” 
The second technological improvements perceived by pilots 
concerns quality of communication between aircrafts and 
between aircrafts and ground forces. Before Link 16, the main 
communication channel was radio transmission. Pilots and 
navigators had to continually listen to voice traffic (from 
AWACS) describing air traffic, mentally convert each 
description into a location and develop an appropriate tactical 
response. In addition, they had to communicate (in English) 
with JTAC in order to obtain the precise target localization 
and thoroughly understand the situation on the ground. With 
Link 16, the most part of voice transmissions is digitalized. 
Tactical data which come from AWACS and ground forces 
are automatically transmitted through system and pilots do not 
have to spend efforts and time in radio exchanges anymore:  
“With Link 16, we quite limit talking.” 
4.1.2 Link 16’s Technological Characteristics 
Could Be Improved 
Through pilots and navigators’ perceptions of Link 16 are 
globally positive, they shed light on some improvements that 
could increase the level of fitness. More precisely, they often 
notice the risk of information overload due to merging issues. 
In rare circumstances, numerous sensors are able to detect the 
same track at a time. On-board computers can become 
saturated and fail to perform merging operations. As a result, 
threat can be overestimated and tactical situation can be 
distorted. Pilots and navigators have to deal with such risks.  
“It’s crazy all information you get and you have to process!” 
“The most important risk is splitting. When tracks 
manoeuvre, merging operations can be delayed.” 
4.2  FIT 2: Analysing the Level of Fitness 
between Decision Maker and Decision 
Support System 
With FIT 2, we seek to understand in which extent 
information provided by system matches with pilots and 
navigators’ internal representations of the problem they deal 
with. Material coding shows that Link 16 usages tend to 
appreciably improve decision makers and system 
complementary. However, such usages could lead to question 
the current decision model. 
4.2.1 Link 16 Usages Enhance Pilots/Navigators 
and System Complementary 
Pilots and navigators’ perception of Link 16 clearly indicates 
that their internal representation of the problem fits with the 
external representation proposed by system. To put it another 
way, pilots’ expectations of what the problem domain will be 
match with the way Link 16 represents it (form and content).  
Indeed, when they answered to the open ended question “How 
are you evaluated the contribution of Link 16 to air operations 
[included CAS]?” many of them stressed on the reduction of 
cognitive workload they take advantage of. No mental 
calculation is required anymore and they can collect 
information much faster and accurate: 
“With Link 16, you don’t feel overloaded anymore.”  
“Tasks related to information management are pretty reduced 
now; Link 16 handles much of them.” 
The resulting of such time and cognitive workload 
compression is freed time saving. This freed time can be used 
to reckon more alternative courses of action and to make more 
decisions in a given period of time. Moreover, instead of 
spending their time to gather and monitor data, they can focus 
on the essential steps of their mission, which means refining 
tactics and developing sense-making:  
“You can dedicate your capacities to tactics.” 
“With Link 16, it becomes possible to conduct instinctive 
fights.” 
4.2.2 Toward Another Decision Making Model? 
These additional capabilities are critical under stressing 
conditions of combat. In effect, they can allow pilots to 
increase the combat speed and finally engage and destroy 
more targets: 
“Link 16 allows doing something fabulous: increasing 
combats’ speed. Actually, you can avoid being seen by others. 
Your enemies? They still process mental calculation.” 
The feeling that Link 16 is able to accelerate time and provide 
combat superiority is shared by many interviewees. It is 
possible to reckon that, with such a decision support system, 
the way they make decision could change. More precisely, the 
current decision model learned by each pilot and navigator at 
a time or another could be questioned. This model is called 
OODA (Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action). It 
proposes four basic processes in decision making, which are 
performed in a cyclical sequence. The “Observe” step is about 
information gathered by all means available (human as well as 
technological). The “Orient” step concerns the analysis of this 
information. It is primarily focused on human abilities to 
process information. Command and control units as well as 
pilots and navigators interpret information in order to create a 
coherent representation of the situation and its implication. 
The “Decide” step is related to the choice of the appropriate 
action. Finally, the “Act” step is about decision 
implementation. 
OODA model could be refined, in taking into account the 
higher level of complementary provided by Link 16. For a 
large part, analysis of the tactical situation is processed by the 
system. Even if the “Orient” step is still based on human 
capabilities, Link 16 significantly supports creation of a 
relevant picture. The modern battlespace can be seen as an 
environment of transparency, where data are quasi-
instantaneously available. In that way, fighters do not 
significantly gain advantage from observation since they 
could all collect and see same data. Orientation is even more 
important since data is worthless without analysis and 
interpretation. In that way, pilots and navigators’ abilities to 
process and exploit data provided by system into practical 
knowledge is becoming critical to perform air missions.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we used Decisional Fit Model to analyze the 
impact of a new Decision Support System, Link 16, on 
decision performance. We discussed that this new system fits 
well with the internal representations of decision-maker and 
task characteristics it has to support. The broad result is that 
this net-centric decision support system leads to enhancement 
of decision performance. However, some improvements could 
be done, especially concerning decision model learned and 
usually exploited by pilots. This OODA model could be 
refined to fit better with decisions that pilots have to make in 
real situations.  
However, our study presents some limitations. Mainly, it is 
outstanding to acknowledge the fact that users’ evaluations of 
DSS in order to appreciate its success cannot be considered as 
an objective measure (Goodhue et al., 2000). Our research 
does not explicitly put into test correlation of pilots’ and 
navigators’ evaluations of Link 16 with objectively measured 
performance. Such a perspective could lead to more 
interesting studies in the future. 
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